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China’s Global South Pivot 2026: Fast Growth, Open Questions

Global South EXPOHUB AI Analytics · 2026-11-11

China’s trade with the Global South keeps growing fast in 2026. Trade with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) rose 24.7% in January-July (China’s Ministry of Commerce), Latin America’s 17.6% in January-May (China’s Foreign Ministry) and Africa’s 22% in January-September (China customs data). China’s global trade surplus reached $1.04 trillion in January-October, above $1 trillion for the second year running (Associated Press, AP, 10 November 2026). The growth is raising questions as well as volumes. Are these flows building capacity in Global South economies, or deepening imbalances? Does tariff-free access turn into real entry for products that need approval? And how are partners adjusting as Chinese goods arrive in larger volumes? Context: A Measurable Shift, Not a One-Way One Developing economies now take a larger share of what China sells. On S&P Global’s broad definition of the Global South (including Central Asia and Eastern Europe, excluding Russia, Japan and South Korea), the group took 44% of Chinese exports in 2024, up from 35% in 2015. China also bought about $1 trillion of goods from it, roughly four times its imports from Western Europe and six times those from the United States. The shift is not one-way. In October 2026 China’s exports to the United States rose 32.9% year on year, from a low base after tariffs hit trade in 2025, and China’s surplus with the US for January-October was about $266.5 billion (AP). The sections below look at these questions in turn: balance, access and how partners respond. Key Numbers $1.04 trillion: China’s global trade surplus in January-October 2026, above $1 trillion for the second year in a row. In October alone, exports were 35.2% higher than a year earlier and imports 41.6% higher. High-tech goods such as semiconductors and autos have supported export growth this year, while the jump in imports partly reflects a recovery in crude oil shipments from the Persian Gulf (AP) 44%: Global South share of Chinese exports in 2024, up from 35% in 2015 (S&P Global) $744.41 billion: China-ASEAN trade in January-July 2026, up 24.7% (China’s Ministry of Commerce, as reported by Business Today Malaysia, 1 September 2026) $257 billion: China-Gulf trade in 2024, narrowly above the $256 billion of Gulf trade with the US, UK and Eurozone combined (Asia House) $549 billion: China-Latin America trade in 2025; January-May 2026 trade reached $247.3 billion, up 17.6% (Zhang Run, China’s Foreign Ministry, 11 June 2026) $348 billion: China-Africa trade in 2025, with an African deficit of about $102 billion, up 64.5% (Nanyang Technological University, NTU, Centre for African Studies, 30 January 2026) $312.11 billion: China-Africa trade in January-September 2026, up 22% (China customs data, reported 1 November 2026) 53: African countries with zero-tariff treatment, covering 33 least-developed countries (LDCs) from 1 December 2024 and 20 others from 1 May 2026 to 30 April 2028 (Chinese authorities, April 2026) $126.4 billion: Chinese construction contracts and investment deals in Belt and Road countries in the first half of 2026, the highest for any first half since 2013. Construction contracts rose $12.2 billion to $76.5 billion, while investment fell $6.2 billion to $49.8 billion (Green Finance & Development Center, GFDC) Deep Dive: Scale, Balance, Access, Response Scale. Growth in 2026 is broad but not even. Each region below is shown for the latest period available, so the periods differ. ASEAN: trade reached $744.41 billion in January-July, up 24.7% (China’s Ministry of Commerce). About two-thirds of the flow is intermediate goods, those used in further production; they reached 2.86 trillion yuan in the first half, up 24.5% (VietnamPlus, citing China customs). Gulf: trade was $257 billion in 2024, the latest figure available. The United Arab Emirates (46%) and Saudi Arabia (38%) account for most of it (Asia House, November 2025). Latin America: trade was $549 billion in 2025 and $247.3 billion in January-May 2026 (Zhang Run, Director-General of the Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, China’s Foreign Ministry). Central Asia: trade passed $100 billion in 2025, reaching $106.3 billion (China’s Ministry of Commerce, via Astana Times). The first quarter of 2026 was mixed: trade with China rose 46.7% in Kazakhstan and 36.7% in Uzbekistan, but fell 34.4% in Kyrgyzstan and 4.3% in Turkmenistan (China customs data, via Qazinform, 5 May 2026). Balance: capacity or imbalance? Africa shows the question most clearly. In 2025, China-Africa trade reached a record $348 billion. Chinese exports rose 25.8% to $225 billion, while imports from Africa rose only 5.4% to $123 billion. Africa’s deficit grew 64.5% to about $102 billion, from about $62 billion in 2024 (NTU). Africa’s sales are mainly crude oil and minerals (MP-IDSA, the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses). In 2026 the gap has kept widening: First quarter: the deficit rose to $29.07 billion from $19.23 billion a year earlier (MP-IDSA, 9 June 2026). First half: trade reached $203.5 billion, up 24%. Chinese exports rose 26.2% to $130.0 billion, imports from Africa rose 20.3% to $73.5 billion, and the deficit reached $56.5 billion, a new high (Ecofin Agency). January-September: trade reached $312.11 billion, up 22% (China customs data). That is slightly below the first-half rate, which implies a slower third quarter. Africa is also selling more to China. Imports from Africa rose 20.3% in the first half in dollar terms (Ecofin Agency) and 23.5% to 193.8 billion yuan in May-June in yuan terms (General Administration of Customs, GAC, via ecns). The two rates are in different currencies and cannot be compared directly. Two cautions apply. The first-half data cover four months before zero tariffs were extended to 20 more countries, so the growth cannot be credited to the policy. And the headline figures do not show whether the gain comes from farm and processed goods or from oil and minerals. Beijing rejects the imbalance framing. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said that about 75% of China’s exports to Africa are capital and intermediate goods, which he described as inputs for Africa’s industrialization and agricultural modernization, and that “international trade is a two-way street. There’s no forced trade” (Foreign Ministry briefing of 27 July 2026, as reported by the China Global South Project). The open question is what the deficit means for African industrial capacity, and the data published so far do not settle it. Latin America’s export structure is also commodity-heavy. Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center (BU GDP) finds that unrefined copper ore accounts for nearly one-fourth of the region’s revenue from trade with China, and that mining, energy and automotive took 86% of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region over the past five years. Capital flows send a mixed signal. According to GFDC (26 July 2026), Chinese construction contracts and investment deals in Belt and Road countries totalled $126.4 billion in the first half of 2026, the highest for any first half since 2013. The mix shifted: construction contracts rose $12.2 billion to $76.5 billion, while investment fell $6.2 billion to $49.8 billion. Africa topped the regional ranking with $33.5 billion of investment, up 254% year on year, led by Ethiopia ($14.8 billion, from two announcements on green-energy generation and manufacturing) and Egypt ($12.2 billion in announcements). Kazakhstan’s announcements included two aluminium processing facilities worth $2.5 billion. Announcements are not completed investments, but those that include manufacturing or processing in the host country speak directly to the capacity question. Access: from tariff to approval. China has extended zero-tariff treatment to all 53 African countries it has diplomatic ties with, but the terms differ. The 33 LDCs have had every tariff line at zero since 1 December 2024. For 20 others, from 1 May 2026 to 30 April 2028, a preferential zero rate applies to 11,951 tariff lines; 95 lines, including grains, sugar and cotton, get zero only within quotas, and around 30 lines are excluded (Thomson Reuters summary of the April 2026 announcements). Much of Africa’s trade was already duty-free: about 94.5% of its $115.6 billion of exports to China in 2024, including oil, minerals, copper, gold and cobalt, entered without duty, and analyst Thierry Pairault argues that the real gain from the extension lies in the remaining 5.5% (China Global South Project, 3 April 2026, based on Comtrade data). Whether the policy opens new products is therefore still an open question. A tariff cut is also not an approval. A research analyst at MP-IDSA argues that for agricultural and processed goods non-tariff barriers “can be more difficult than tariffs themselves.” Fresh produce, for example, needs a protocol agreed with China’s customs authority: South Africa signed its first cherry protocol on 8 September 2026, in a market where China imported about 586,900 tonnes of cherries worth $3.3 billion in 2025 (South African government). Access also brings dependence. Brazil-China trade reached $171 billion in 2025, more than double Brazil’s trade with the United States (China-Brazil Business Council). In January-July 2026 China took 71% of Brazil’s soybean exports (National Association of Grain Exporters, ANEC, via Global Times). Response: how partners are adjusting. Responses differ. Mexico’s trade deficit with China reached $120 billion in 2024 against about $9 billion of exports (AP, via Fortune, 2 February 2026), and since 1 January 2026 Mexico applies tariffs of 5% to 50% on 1,463 tariff lines from countries without a free-trade agreement, China among them (Mexico News Daily). Chile has raised tariffs and imposed a 19% value-added tax (VAT) on low-value parcels (AP). Argentina’s deficit with China rose to nearly $8.2 billion in 2025, its e-commerce imports soared 237% in October from a year earlier, and the head of a textile-industry foundation told AP: “We’re under indiscriminate attack.” In March 2026 South Africa imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on Chinese structural steel, at 74.98%, up from a provisional 52.81% introduced in 2024, following an investigation by its International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) (SteelOrbis; Bizcommunity). Brazil moved the other way: in May 2026 it scrapped federal taxes on parcels worth up to $50, a change Caixin reported as benefiting Chinese vendors. Taking stock. The evidence supports four cautious conclusions. Trade is growing in both directions, but not equally: Africa’s deficit with China widened in 2025 and again in the first quarter of 2026, while China’s imports from Africa also grew. For African exporters, the zero-tariff extension matters mainly if it opens products that previously faced duties; for fresh produce, approvals remain a separate gate. Partners are not converging on one response: Mexico, Chile and South Africa have added barriers, Argentina’s textile industry is protesting, and Brazil has loosened a tax. The evidence cannot yet show whether the growth is building local capacity, because most indicators so far are announcements, not completed investment. What This Means for Business For exporters to China, especially in agriculture: the opening is real, but entry is product by product. Check whether your product has an agreed protocol before planning volumes, check whether its tariff line falls under a quota or is excluded, and watch concentration risk: when one buyer takes 71% of a country’s soybeans, as China does in Brazil, there is little room to redirect. For importers and manufacturers in Latin America and South Africa: tariffs, taxes and anti-dumping duties already apply to some Chinese goods in Mexico, Chile and South Africa, while Brazil has gone the other way. Check the tariff line before contracting. For investors and policymakers: look at what stays in the host country. GFDC records processing and manufacturing announcements in Ethiopia and Kazakhstan, while BU GDP finds Latin America’s exports to China concentrated in unrefined copper ore. Frequently Asked Questions How large is China’s trade with the Global South? On S&P Global’s broad definition, the group took 44% of Chinese exports in 2024, up from 35% in 2015, and China imported about $1 trillion of goods from it. Does zero tariff mean African products can enter China freely? Not automatically. The 33 LDCs have every tariff line at zero since 1 December 2024. For 20 others, from 1 May 2026 to 30 April 2028, a preferential zero rate covers 11,951 lines, 95 lines get zero only within quotas and around 30 are excluded. Fresh produce also needs a protocol with China’s customs authority. Is Africa’s deficit with China growing, and how does Beijing see it? Yes. The deficit was about $102 billion in 2025, up from about $62 billion in 2024, and $29.07 billion in the first quarter of 2026 against $19.23 billion a year earlier (MP-IDSA). Beijing rejects the imbalance framing and points to the share of capital and intermediate goods, about 75%, in its exports to Africa (Lin Jian, Foreign Ministry). What do the data not yet show? Four things. Whether the 2026 rise in imports from Africa comes from farm and processed goods rather than oil and minerals. How much of it zero tariffs explain, since first-half data cover four months before the extension. How many Belt and Road announcements will become completed investment. And how the balance looks outside Africa: for ASEAN the brief has 2026 volumes but no split into exports and imports, and for the Gulf the latest figure is for 2024. The next test is second-half data for Africa, the first half-year entirely under the extension. Selectors: Country: China. Industry: International Trade Context event: China International Import Expo 2026. Alliance: BRICS.

Context event: China International Import Expo (CIIE) 2026

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